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lndex No. 2090/2016
-against-

BOARD OF PAROLE, STATE OF NEW YORK,

_________
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HON. PETER M . FORMAN, Acting Supreme Court Justice
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This Article 78 proceeding challenges a decision of the New York State Division of
Parole (the "Board") denying Petitioner's third application for release to parole supervision.
By Indictments #2382/91 and #7961/91, a grand jury sitting in Queens County charged
Petitioner with numerous sex crimes involving three young girls under the age of thirteen. These
crimes allegedly occurred at Petitioner's home over an eighteen-month-period, during a period of
time that he was acting as a Santeria priest.

On July 22, 1992, Petitioner was convicted of 23 counts alleged in the indictment, all of
which stenuned from his systematic sexual abuse of a 10-year-old girl and a 12-year-oJd girl.
Specifically, Petitioner was convicted of fi~e co~~ts of Rape in the First Degree, two counts of
Rape in the Second Degree, six counts of Sodomy in the First Degree, four counts of Sexual
Abuse in the First Degree, four counts of Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, and two counts of
Endangering the Welfare of a Child.
On September 14, 1992, the trial court imposed indeterminate sentences of 6 to 18 years
imprisonment for each of Petitioner's convictions for Rape in the First Degree. The trial court
also imposed indeterminate sentences of 6 to 18 years imprisonment for each of Petitioner's
convictions for Sodomy in the First Degree. The trial court also imposed indeterminate sentences
of 2 to 6 years imprisonment for each of Petitioner's convictions for Sexual Abuse in the First
Degree. The trial court also imposed an indeterminate sentence of 3 to 9 years imprisonment for
one of Petitioner's convictions for Rape in the Second Degree, and 2 to 6 years imprisonment on
Petitioner's other conviction for Rape in the Second Degree. Finally, the trial court imposed
sentences of one year imprisonment for each of Petitioner's convictions for Sexual Abuse in the
Second Degree and Endangering the Welfare of a Child.
When the trial court imposed these sentences, it directed that Counts 1-6 of Indictment
#2382/91 run concurrent to each other. The longest sentence in that six-count bundle was 6 to 18
years imprisonment.
The trial court also directed that Counts 10-13 of Indictment #23 82/9 J run concurrent to
each other, but consecutive to Counts 1-6. The longest sentence in that four-count bundle was 6
to 18 years imprisonment.
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The trial court also directed that Counts 31, 33, and 35 of Indictment #2382/91 run
concurrent to each other, but consecutive to Counts 1-6 and Counts 10-13. The longest sentence
in that three-count bundle was 2 to 6 years imprisonment.
Finally, the trial court directed that Counts 1and2 of Indictment #7961/91 run concurrent
to each other, but consecutive to Counts 1-6 of Indictment #2382/91. The longest sentence in
that two-count bundle was 6 to 18 years imprisonment.
As a result of the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences, Petitioner' s aggregate
indeterminate sentence was 20 to 60 years imprisonment. Petitioner's conviction and sentence
were subsequently affirmed. [People v. Berta, 213 AD2d 659 (2d Dept. 1995)].
On February 16, 2016, Petitioner appeared before two commissioners of the Board.
During that hearing, Petitioner denied any responsjbility for his crimes. Petitioner also accused
the step-father of one of his victims of lying to hide his own sex crimes, and accused the mother
of another victim of lying because she had allegedly been threatened with incarceration if she did
not level false accusations against him. Petitioner also accused at least one of the victims, and a
friend o f a victim, oflying during his trial. Petitioner also accused doctors of providing false
testimony during the trial.
During the hearing before the Board, Petitioner also acknowledged that he had not
p articipated in any sex offender treatment programs offered by the Department of Corrections
and Community Supervision. However, he represented that he would be willing to participate in
such a program following his release from prison. Petitioner also acknowledged incurring one
Tier II violation since his last appearance before the Board.
The Board acknowledged receipt of the portfolio that Petitioner had compiled in support
of his appl ication for release to parole supervision. The Board noted that this portfolio included
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numerous letters of support, and evidence of significant program accomplishments. The Board
also noted that this portfolio included a written statement from Petitioner in which he continued

-

to deny responsibility for his crimes, and continued to blame the step-father of one of his victims.
The Board also acknowledged receipt of Petitioner's COMPAS risk assessment
instrument. The Board characterized Petitioner's risk scores as "low across the board," and noted
that his risk of substance abuse was also deemed "unlikely."
The Board also acknowledged receipt of Petitioner's case plan, and noted that Petitioner
intended to reside with his wife upon his release. During the hearing, Petitioner stated that he had
a positive relationship with his wife, his adult daughters, and his grandchildren. Petitioner also
stated that he planned to support himself upon bis release through social security benefits, and
through rental income generated by properties that he and his wife own.
Following the close of the hearing and subsequent deliberations, the Board denied
Petitioner's application for release to parole supervision. Upon announcing that decision, the
Board stated that it "commends your productive use of time and personal growth." However, the
Board also noted that discretionary release is not granted merely as a reward for good conduct
while incarcerated.
The Board stated that it reached its decision after considering all of the required statutory
factors, including Petitioner's risk to the community, his rehabilitative efforts, and his needs for
successful re-entry in the community. The Board ultimately concluded that Petitioner's release
would be incompatible with public safety, and that it would undermine respect for the law. [n
reaching this conclusion, the Board noted that Petitioner lacked insight into the seriousness of his
crimes, and that he continued to deny responsibility and to blame others. The Board was also
troubled by Petitioner's failure to participate in sex offender treatment programs "to assist with
4

your much needed rehabilitation." Accordingly, the Board denied Petitioner's application for
release to parole supervision, subject to his ability to seek release again in 24 months.

On June 24, 2016, Petitioner perfected his administrative appeal from that denial. On
August 4, 2016, the Appeals Unit denied Petitioner's appeal. This Article 78 proceeding ensued.
The Petition alleges, inter alia: that the Board's decision failed to comply with the
requirements of Executive Law §§ 259-c and 259-i; that the Board has failed to adopt written
parole release decision-making procedures as required by Executive Law §259-c; that
Petitioner's lack of insight is not an appropriate factor for the Board to consider; that the Board
improperly showed and acted with bias against Petitioner because only two commissioners heard
and decided his application; that the Board acted as a sentencing judge when it denied
Petitioner's application for release to parole supervision; that the Board denied his application
based solely on the facts underlying his conviction; that the Board failed to properly consider the
COMP AS risk and needs assessment that had been prepared by the Department of Corrections
and Community Supervision; that the Board's decision does not include sufficiently detailed
reasons supporting its determination; that the Board's determination violates Petitioner's
procedural and substantive due process rights; and that the Board decision to reconsider his
application in 24 months was excessive. Therefore, Petitioner argues that the Board's denial of
his application for release to parole supervision must be annulled and vacated because it was in
violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error oflaw, and was arbitrary and capricious
or otherwise unlawful.
For the reasons stated herein, the Verified Petition is denied, and this Article 78
proceeding is dismissed.
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DISCUSSION
"A parole determination may be set aside only when the determination to deny the
petitioner release on parole evinced 'irrationality bordering on impropriety.' " (Matter of
Goldberg v. New York State Board of Parole, 103 AD3d 634, 634 (2d Dept. 2013) quoting
Matter of Martinez v. New York State Division of Parole. 73 AD3d 1067, 1067 (2d Dept. 2010).
See also Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 (2000); Matter of Russo v. New York
State Bd. of Parole. 50 NY2d 69, 77 (1980)]."The burden is on the petitioner to make a
convincing demonstration of entitlement to such relief." [Matter of Duffy v. New York State
Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 965, 966 (2d Dept. 2010). See also Matter of Goldberg v. New
York State Board of Parole, 103 AD3d 634, 635 (2d Dept. 2013); Matter of Midgette v. New
York State Division of Parole, 70 AD3d 1039, 1040 (2d Dept. 2010)].
There is no merit to Petitioner's claim that the Board has failed to adopt parole release
decision-making procedures as required by Executive Law §259-c. Rather, those procedures were
adopted effective July 30, 2014 [see 9 NYCRR §8002.3]. Prior to the adoption of those fonna l
regulations, it was well-settled that the written procedures contained in an October 5, 2011
memorandum from former Chairwoman Andrea Evans complied with the requirements of
Executive Law §259-c(4) and §259-i(2)(c)(A). [see e.g., Matter of Partee v. Evans, 117 AD3d
1258 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d
1268 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter of Singh v. Evans, 118 AD3d 1209 (3d Dept. 2014)). And when it
promulgated the regulations that are now set forth in §8002.3, the Board clearly stated that its
intent was "to memorialize the written procedures" contained in the 2011 memorandum. [Matter
of Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, 202, fn. l (3d Dept. 2014), quoting Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision Proposed Rule Making, NY Reg., December 18, 2013
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at 1). The regulations that were adopted at the conclusion of that rule making process are, in fact,
consistent with the 2011 memorandum. [Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 AD3d 1413 (4th
~-
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Dept. 2014); Matter of Byas v. Fischer, 120 AD3d 1586 (4th Dept. 2014)]. As such, those
regulations continue to comply with the requirements of Executive Law §259-c and §259-i.
There is also no merit to Petitioner's claims that the Board improperly denied his
application based solely on the facts underlying his conviction and that the Board failed to
properly consider the COMP AS risk and needs assessment. Pursuant to Executive Law §
259- i(2)(c), the Board "is required to consider a number of statutory factors in determining
whether an irunate should be released on parole." [Matter of Goldberg v. New York State Board
of Parole, 103 AD3d 634, 634 (2d Dept. 2013), quoting Matter of Gelsomino v. New York State
Board of Parole. 82 AD3d 1097, 1098 (2d Dept. 2011)). "The Parole Board is not required to
give equal weight to each statutory factor, and it is not required to 'articulate specifically each
factor in its determination. '"[Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 AD3d 948,
948 (2d Dept. 2012), quoting Matter of Huntley v. Evans. 77 AD3d 945, 947 (2d Dept. 2010).

See also Matter ofThomches v. Evans,.108 AD3d 724, 724 (2d Dept. 201 3); Matter of Angel v.
Travis, 1 AD3d 859, 860 (3d Dept. 2003) ("It should be noted that although the Board articulated
the most compelling factors influencing its decision, it was under no obligation to discuss every
factor it considered"). "Notably, parole need not be granted as a reward for good conduct, nor as
a quid pro quo for participation in recommended DOCS programs." [£eople ex rel. Germenis v.
Cunningham, 73 AD3d 1297, 1298 (3d Dept. 20 I 0). See also Malter of Mentor v. New York
State Division of Parole, 87 AD3d 1245, 1246 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter ofGutkaiss v. New York
State Division of Parole, 50 AD3d 1418, 1418 (3d Dept. 2008)].
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The Board is also "entitled to place greater emphasis on the serious nature of the crimes
over the other factors" [Matter of Vigliotti v. State Executive Division of Parole, 98 AD3d 789,
790-91 (3d Dept. 2012)], including the violent nature of that crime. [Matter of Angel v. Travis,

supra at 860, quoting Matter of Lue-Shing v. Pataki, 301AD2d827, 828 (3d Dept. 2003). See
also Matter of Patterson v. Evans, 106 AD3d 1456 (4th Dept., May 3, 2013); Matter of
MacKenzie v. Evans, 95 AD3d 1613, 1614 (3d Dept. 2012)]. It is also within the Board's
discretion to conclude that the severity of an inmate's offense outweighs an exemplary
institutional record and letters of support, even when one of those letters has been written by the
victim's mother. [Matter of Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 AD3d 371, 371 (1st Dept. 2007). See

also Matter of Anthony v. New York State Division of Parole, 17 AD3d 301, 301 (lst Dept.
2005); Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 AD3d 385, 385-86 (2d Dept. 2004)).
There is no merit to Petitioner's assertion that his lack of insight into his crimes is not an
appropriate factor for the Board to consider. [Matter of Crawford v. New York State Board of
Parole, 144 AD3d 1308 (3d Dept. 2016) (the Board "was entitled to, and properly did, place great
emphasis upon the egregious and protracted nature of petitioner's crimes and his lack of insight
and failure to accept responsibility"); Matter of Graziano v. Evans, 90 AD3d 1367, 1369 (3d
Dept. 201 l) (citations omitted) (the Board "can consider factors - such as remorse and insight
into the offense - that are not enumerated in the statute but nonetheless relevant to an assessment
of whether an inmate presents a danger to the community")]. Likewise, there is no merit to
Petitioner's assertion that the proceedings were impaired by bias because his application was
heard and decided by a two-member panel. The relevant statute and agency regulations
specifically authorize a two-member panel [see Executive Law §259-i (2)(a); 9 NYCRR
§8002.2(b)]. There is also no evidence to support Petitioner's conclusory assertion that the
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proceedings were impaired by bias [Matter of Grune v. Board of Parole, 41 AD3d 1014, 1015
(3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Johnson v. New York State Board of Parole, 16 AD3d 750, 751 (3d
Dept. 2005}].
Here, the B9ard properly considered Petitioner's institutional record, his program
accomplishments, his release plan and his letters of support. The Board also properly considered
the COMPAS risks and needs assessment that had been prepared as required by the Executive
Law. The Board acknowledged that the COMPAS assigned a low probability to the risk that
Petitioner would commit crimes or acts of violence if released, and that his risk of substance
abuse was also deemed unlikely. The Board also properly considered and reviewed the
circumstances and severity of Petitioner's crimes, his lack of insight and failure to accept
responsibility for those ci;imes, and his failure to participate in sex offender treatment programs.
Contrary to Petitioner's assertions, the Board properly incorporated the COMPAS risk
and needs assessment in its determination as required by Executive Law §259-c(4) and §259i(2)(c)(A). Although the COMPAS assigned Petitioner low risk scores, that one factor is not
dispositive. [see Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 AD3d 1059, 1060-61 (3d Dept. 2014)
("Although petitioner's COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment Instrument indicated that he was
at a low risk for violence, rearrest and absconding, the COMPAS instrument is only one factor
that the Board is required to consider"). See also Matter of Rivers v. Evans, 119 AD3d 1188 (3d
Dept. 2014); Matter of Rivera v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107 (3d Dept.
2014); Matter of Williams v. New York State Division of Parole, 114 AD3d 992 (3d Dept.
2014)).
Ultimately, "whether the Board considered the proper factors and followed the proper
guidelines are questions that should be assessed based upon the 'written determination evaluated
9

in the context of the parole hearing transcript."' (Matter of Jackson v. Evans, 118 AD3d 701 (2d
Dept. 2014), quoting Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 11 NY3d 777, 778 (2008)]. Considering
the parole hearing transcript as a whole, there is no merit to Petitioner' s claim that the Board
failed to provide a sufficient explanation of the reasons supporting its determination

IBl at 702.

See also Matter of Fraser v. Evans, 109 AD3d 701 (2d Dept. 2013); Matter of Galbreith y, New
York State Division of Parole, 58 AD3d 731 (2d Dept. 2009)].
Under the relevaµt standard of review, the Board's determination that Petitioner should
not be released from confinement at this time was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and the Board
did not act as a sentencing judge when it denied his application for release to parole supervision
[Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Board of Parole, 139 AD3d 1068 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter
of Ramos v. Heath, 106 AD3d 747 (2d Dept. 2013); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 AD3d 1305
(2013); Matter of Rodriguez v. Evans, 102 AD3d 1049, 1050 (3d Dept. 2013)]. There is also no
evidence that the Board's determination was irrational to the point of bordering on impropriety.
(Matter of Cruz v. New York State Division of Parole, 39 AD3d 1060, 1062 (3d Dept. 2007)
(stating that while the court found the petitioner's "academic and institutional achievements
exemplary," and that the court considered the petitioner to be "a prime candidate for parole
release," the Board's decision to deny parole would be upheld because it did not exhibit
"irrationality bordering on impropriety"). See also Matter of Thomches v. Evans, 108 AD3d 724,
724-25 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Rivera v. New York State Division of Parole, 95 AD3d 1586,
1587 (3d Dept. 2012); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 AD3d 1320, 1321 (3d Dept. 2011 )].
Finally, there is no merit to Petitioner's claim that his procedural and substantive due
process rights were violated [Matter of Freeman v. New York State Division of Parole, 21 AD3d
1174, (3d Dept. 2005)], and there is no evidence that the 24-month hold imposed by the Board
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was excessive under the circumstances presented [Matter of Thompson v. New York State Board
of Parole, 120 AD3d 1518, 1519 (3d Dept. 2014)]. Because Petitioner's remaining contentions
are also without merit, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Verified Petition is denied, and that
this Article 78 proceeding is dismissed.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision, Order and Judgment of this Court.
Dated: Poughkeepsie, NY
February 8, 2017

PETER M. FORMAN
ACTING SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
TO:

Roberto Berta, #92A8135
Fishkill Correctional Facility
PO Box 1245
Beacon, New York 12508
Heather Rubinstein, Esq.
New York State Attorney General's Office
One Civic Center Plaza
Suite 401
Poughkeepsie, NY 1260 l
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